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Randomization  with asymmetric  information 
Richard Arnott* 
and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz* * 
It is by now well known that, in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection, random- 
ization of insurance premiums and benefits may be Pareto efficient. This article provides a 
typology of the various  forms that randomization may take, derives necessary or sufficient 
conditions  for the desirability of these various  forms of randomization, obtains some simple 
characterization theorems of the efficient random policies, gives some intuition behind the 
results, and considers why randomization appears to occur less often in practice than the 
theory suggests it should. 
1.  Introduction 
*  During the past fifteen years, an extensive literature  has developed analyzing  the structure 
of adverse-selection and moral-hazard (principal -  agent) problems. Early on it was rec- 
ognized that these problems may not have the usual convexity-concavity properties so fa- 
miliar to economists; and only a few years later, it was realized that this in turn implies 
that in a variety of circumstances randomization is efficient.' 
The aims of this article  are to provide a typology of the various forms that randomization 
may take, to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for the desirability2 of these various 
forms of randomization in the context of the standard models of an insurance market with 
moral hazard or adverse selection, to provide some simple characterization  theorems of the 
efficient random policies, to provide some intuition behind the results, and to consider why 
randomization appears to occur less often in practice than the theory suggests it should. 
Many of our results are new. Some (Propositions 2, 4, and 6),  however, are not. In 
* Boston College and Queens University. 
* * Stanford University. 
This article was written in conjunction with the authors' research  project on moral hazard, financial support 
for which has been provided by the National Science Foundation, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada, and the Olin Foundation. Part of the work on the article was done when Stiglitz was a Visiting 
Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford. We are grateful to the referees and the editors, especially Ken Judd, 
whose comments resulted in substantial expansion and revision which have, we hope, improved the clarity of the 
article. Any remaining errors are our responsibility. 
' The earliest studies were in the context of the problems of optimal taxation (Weiss,  1976; Stiglitz, 1982a, 
1982b; Balcer and Sadka, 1982). 
2 When we say that randomization  is "desirable,"  we mean that there exists a Pareto-improving  randomization. 
Also, if randomization is desirable, it will be used by insurance firms in competitive equilibrium (as long as they 
can observe their clients' total purchases of insurance) and by a monopoly insurer. 
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particular, several recent articles have investigated the desirability of randomization of in- 
surance contracts in the presence of moral hazard (Holmstr6m,  1979; Gjesdal, 1982; Fel- 
lingham, Kwon, and Newman,  1984). All treat a continuum of possible outcomes, which 
tends to obscure intuition.  We rederive their results for the two-outcome  case by using 
derivations that highlight the intuition. 
Section 2 treats randomization with moral hazard, and Section 3 treats randomization 
with adverse selection. The concluding section contains a discussion of why randomization 
is not so common as theory suggests it should be, which casts doubt on the appropriateness 
of several of the standard assumptions employed in the incentives and contract literatures. 
Throughout the moral-hazard section we cast the problem in terms of a monopoly 
insurer who maximizes profits subject to providing his clients with an exogenously specified 
level of expected utility and subject also to the relevant incentive-compatibility constraints. 
This allows us to characterize Pareto-efficient contracts. In the adverse-selection section, 
meanwhile, we found it more natural to develop the analysis in the context of a competitive 
insurance market. Throughout the article competitive equilibrium (when it exists) corre- 
sponds to the solution of the monopoly  problem with expected utility at the competitive 
equilibrium level(s).3  Thus, when we say that randomization is desirable, we mean that 
randomization is Pareto efficient, is profitable for a monopoly insurer, and is a characteristic 
of competitive equilibrium. 
2.  Moral  hazard 
*  Consider the simplest moral-hazard setting. There are a large number of identical in- 
dividuals, each of whom realizes one of two possible outcomes or events. Either an accident 
does not occur, in which case the individual receives w before insurance, or an accident4 
does occur, in which case the individual receives w -  d, where d is the accident damage. 
The probability that an accident occurs depends on the individual's accident-prevention 
effort, e; i.e., p = p(e).  We assume that p' < 0  and p" >  0, and that the individual always 
expends some effort in the monopoly solution. Also, individuals' accident probabilities are 
statistically independent. 
Moral hazard arises  because an insurer is unable to observe effort. As a result, insurance 
contracts cannot be written contingent on effort. We assume that the insurer can, however, 
observe  his clients' total insurance purchases.5  In these circumstances  a nonrandom  insurance 
contract will specify a (net)  insurance payout or benefit a payable to an individual if an 
accident occurs and an insurance premium : payable by the individual if an accident does 
not occur. Thus, consumption (y) is w -  d +  a when an accident does occur, and w - 
when it does not. 
The individual's expected utility is 
EU=  (1 -p(e))Uo(w-  f,  e) + p(e)U1(w-  d + a, e),  (1) 
where UO  is the no-accident utility function and U1  the accident utility function. We assume 
that 
a__  a2u.  au- 
> 0,  d  j <0,  J <  0  for  j  = 0,  1. 
Note that this specification permits utility functions to be outcome-contingent; the accident 
may have nonpecuniary effects or influence tastes. We shall have occasion to particularize 
(1): 
'This  equivalence can be established on the basis of arguments presented in Arnott and Stiglitz [1988b]. 
4 "Accident" may be reinterpreted  as large  damage conditional on an accident's occurring,  and "no accident" 
as small damage conditional on an accident's occurring. 
I The assumption of a monopoly insurer  implies this assumption. This assumption is, however, consequential 
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(i)  separable utility function 
EU=  (1 -p(e))uo(w-  d)  +p(e)u1(w-  d+  a) -  e  (la) 
with uj  >  0 and uV <  0 for j  =  0,  1, and effort is measured in terms of the disutility it 
causes; 
(ii)  separable, event-independent utility function 
EU = (  -p(e))u(w  -  A) + p(e)u(w-d  + a))-e.  (lb) 
The individual chooses effort  to maximize expected utility, while taking the parameters 
of the insurance contract as given. This yields a function or correspondence relating effort 
to the parameters of the insurance contract, e = e(a,  p3),  which, when substituted into the 
expected utility function, EU,  yields expected utility as a function of a  and A, v(a,  A). 
When constrained to choosing a nonrandom contract, the insurer's problem is to choose 
(a,  A) to maximize profits subject to providing his clients with a given level of expected 
utility.6 
The question to be addressed is: under what circumstances does randomization of the 
parameters  of the insurance contract result in a welfare improvement? 
The basic intuition behind why randomization might be desirable is this. Moral hazard 
causes a tradeoff between risk-bearing  and incentives, since if full insurance were provided, 
the insured would take little or no accident-prevention effort. As a result, the deterministic 
monopoly insurance contract typically entails the insured's receiving less than full insurance 
and expending less than the first-best (i.e.,  with effort observable) level of effort. A com- 
pensated randomization of insurance may cause the insured to increase effort by enough 
that profits are increased. The techniques of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)  can be used to 
ascertain conditions under which a mean-preserving randomization of, say, the payout will 
increase effort at accident avoidance; randomization will do so provided only that the first- 
order  condition for effort is convex in the payout. Randomization also has a direct, negative 
effect on risk-averse individuals. Thus, whether randomization is desirable depends on a 
careful  balancing of the welfare gains from the mitigation of the moral-hazard  problem with 
the welfare losses from increased risk. While the latter depend on the degree of risk aversion 
(which depends on first and second derivatives of the utility function),  the former depend 
on the degree of concavity of the first-order  condition for effort (which depends on first, 
second, and third derivatives of the utility function).  There appears to be no a priori reason 
why the effort effect should not outweigh the risk effect. This intuition  turns out to be 
correct.7 
o  The forms of randomization.  We shall consider two types of randomization. If the re- 
alization of the random policy occurs before  the insured individual makes his effort  decision, 
we shall say that the randomization is ex ante; if it occurs after his effort decision, ex post. 
In all cases, we assume that the individual knows fully the nature of the randomization 
being undertaken. With ex post randomization, the insurer quotes a set of random policies 
{  (ai,  pli,  Qi) I  i =  1, . ..  , n }, which we term the insurance contract, where Qi (I  Qi =  1) is 
the probability that policy i will be assigned to the individual after he has made his effort 
decision. The individual makes his effort decision and only afterwards finds out which of 
the policies the insurance company  has assigned him. With ex ante randomization, the 
insurer again quotes a set of random policies {  (av, (3,, Qi) I  i =  1, . ..  , n } but now Qi is the 
probability  that policy i will be assigned to the individual before  he makes his effort decision. 
6 This problem is treated exhaustively in Arnott and Stiglitz (1988a). 
7 This intuition applies to what we shall identify in the next subsection as ex post randomization. A rather 
different  set of arguments is relevant for ex ante randomization, as we shall show below. ARNOTT AND STIGLITZ  /  347 
The individual is randomly assigned a policy and then makes his effort decision. To simplify 
the analysis  we shall consider  each form of randomization in isolation. Thus, in the subsection 
on ex post randomization, we exclude ex ante randomization by assumption, and in the 
section on ex ante randomization, we exclude ex post randomization by assumption. 
o  Ex post  randomization.  The insurer chooses that insurance contract that maximizes his 
expected profits, subject to providing his clients with a given level of expected utility and 
while taking into account the dependence of effort on the terms of the contract. We can 
formalize the problem as a two-stage (indirect control) problem. In the first stage the in- 
dividual chooses effort, while taking the parameters of the insurance contract as given, to 
maximize his expected utility: 
EU  A  v(oai,  #i, e)Qi,  (2) 
where 
v(ai, #i, e)  Uo(w -  pi, e)(l  -  p(e))  +  U1(w -  d +  a,,  e)p(e). 
This defines 
e  argmax EU.  (3) 
e 
In the second stage the insurer maximizes his expected profit, while taking the dependence 
of the accident probability on effort, and the dependence of effort on the parameters of the 
insurance contracts, into account. In analyzing the second problem, it turns out to be con- 
venient to embed in it the maximization  condition  for the first stage; we thus write the 
insurer's problem as 
max  (A  f3Qi)(l  -p(e))  -  (I  aiQi)p(J)  (4) 
{ (ais3Q,)  Ii=  ...  n) }  i 
subject to 
z  iv(ai, pi, e)Qi 2  U  (expected utility constraint),  (4a) 
z  Qi=  1,  (4b) 
i 
Qi 2  0  Vi,  and  (4c) 
e = argmax EU.  (4d) 
e 
Before proceeding to analyze (4),  we state the following. 
Lemma 1. In the general concave programming problem 
max  z  F(xi)Qi  subject to  z  gi(xi)Qi  <  ci,  Q  =  1 
{  xi,Qi)  i  i  i 
Qi  O  Vi,  xi,0  Vi, 
where xi is a vector of control variables, applied with probability Qi, j indexes constraints, 
F( *  ) is a weakly concave function and gj(  ) are strictly convex constraint functions, ran- 
domization of x is undesirable. 
Lemma 1 is well known and implies in this context that randomization is undesirable 
when the insurer's profit-maximization problem is concave. 
Since (4)  is not in general a concave programming problem, it appears that random- 
ization may in some circumstances be desirable. Characterization of the solution to (4)  is 
difficult.  Two results  may, however,  be obtained. 348  /  THE RAND  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Proposition 1. With ex post randomization at most three insurance policies are needed to 
achieve the optimum. 
Proposition 2. With separable utility functions ex post randomization is never desirable.8 
The first  proposition is established  as follows. The first-order  condition of the individual's 
effort choice problem satisfies 
A,  (9v(aei,  pi,  e)  Qi =  ?.  (5) 
O  (e 
(Because expected utility is not necessarily  a concave function of effort,  (5) is only a necessary 
condition; constraint (4d) is the necessary and sufficient condition.) One may imagine that 
the insurer's problem has been completely  solved, and that one  is told what the profit- 
maximizing random policies are and what the individual's level of effort is, but not the 
probabilities with which the optimal random policies are assigned. The choice of the { Qi } 
is then a standard linear programming problem with three constraints-constraints  (4a) 
and (4b)  and (5)-in  addition to the nonnegativity constraints, which is solved with at 
most three nonzero Qi. 
Proposition 2 is proved by writing the insurer's maximization problem in such a way 
that Lemma 1 may be applied. Suppose that the level of effort chosen by individuals in the 
solution to the monopoly  insurer's problem, e*, has been determined. And let fi0 denote 
the  probability-weighted average of  u0 (recall  (la))  across the  random  contracts, i.e., 
to7  uo  ( w-  w-pi)  Q1,  and define i7l  accordingly. Then the analog to constraint (4a),  written 
in standard 
?  form, is 
-z7o(l  -  p(e*))  -  z7lp(e*)  +  e*  ?  -U  (6a) 
and the analog to constraint (4d)  is 
(u71  -  Fto)p'(e*)  -  1 =  0  (6b) 
(since with separable utility, expected utility is a concave function of effort). 
Substitute (6b)  into (6a) to obtain 
-  -o  ,  p(e*)  +  e*  ?-.  (7a) 
p (e*) 
Since constraints (6a) and (7a) together are equivalent to constraints (6a) and (6b) together, 
the insurer's problem may be rewritten as 
max  (I  f3Q)(1  -p(e*))  -  (:  a1iQi)p(e*)  (8) 
{  ai,,iQ  }  i 
subject to (6a),  2 Qi =  1, Qi 2  0 Vi, and (7a).  Since this programming problem has a 
linear objective function  and constraint functions  that are strictly convex  in  {ai,  fiB}, 
Lemma 1 applies, and so randomization is undesirable. 
The "tricks"  in the proof were to hold e fixed, and to rewrite constraints (6a) and (6b), 
where (6b) is not a convex constraint,  as (6a) and (7a), both of which are convex constraints. 
Proposition 2 and its proof are useful because they provide the basis of a general  theorem 
characterizing  sufficient  conditions for randomization to be undesirable.  If the utility function 
is not separable, the equation analogous to (7a) is 
8 This proposition has been proved previously for the continuum of outcomes case by Holmstrdm (1979). 
Our  proof,  however,  is new. ARNOTT AND  STIGLITZ  /  349 
-  p(e*)F (9OL0OJ  ]  - 
(Po,  yI,  e* )-  +  pl(e*)  [  Oe  p(e*))  +  ]e  p(e*)  c  -U.  (7b) 
where U00 
2 
UO(w 
-  fi,  e*)Qi, 
-  CO  dUo(w -  fl?, e*) 
Qi,  etc. Since (7b)  is not 
Oe  O9e 
necessarily a convex constraint, it appears that randomization may be desirable. Since the 
analog to (6a)  for nonseparable utility is a convex  constraint, if constraint (7b)  is also 
convex, then by Lemma 1 randomization is undesirable, i.e.: 
Proposition 3. A sufficient condition for ex post  randomization to be undesirable is that (p 
be convex in yo and y, jointly. 
Proposition 3 has an immediate corollary. 
Corollary  1. If 
a 
?  0 and  2eo,  0, then  ex post  randomization  is undesirable. 
Note that Proposition 2 is a special case of Corollary 1.9 
Deriving necessary  and sufficient  conditions for randomization to be desirable  is difficult. 
A large randomization may be desirable, even when a small one is not, and the desirability 
of large randomizations depends on global rather than local properties of the functions 
Uo  (* ),  U, ( *  ), and p(  .),  as well as the parameters w and d. '0 Determining necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a local randomization to be desirable is presumably possible, but 
since efficient randomization may entail three random policies (recall Proposition 1), doing 
so would be algebraically very tedious. As a result, we shall adopt the more modest goal of 
deriving a sufficient condition for a local randomization of the payout, while holding the 
premium fixed, to be desirable." 
A necessary  condition for a local randomization of the payout with two random policies 
to be desirable is that a small, mean-preserving spread in a, while holding  3 fixed, increase 
effort. If this condition is not satisfied, then the randomization not only lowers expected 
utility, by exposing the individual to more risk, but also decreases profits by increasing the 
probability of accident. From first principles or from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)  it is 
straightforward  to show that this randomization stimulates effort if and only if 
Uy, + P aedyu  > 0? 
A similar necessary condition is that a small, expected-utility-preserving  spread in a, while 
holding e  fixed, increase effort. If this condition is not satisfied, the randomization unam- 
biguously decreases profits; not only does the probability of accident rise, but also compen- 
sating the individual for the risk he faces is costly. From first principles or from Diamond 
and Stiglitz (1974),  one obtains that this randomization stimulates effort if and only if 
3u  02u,  r  &U,/09y2] 
" 0edy2  P"  Oedy, [OU,/Oy,  ] 
Since  they  are  expressed  in terms  of the characteristics  of the constraint  set, Propositions  2 and 3, as well 
as Corollary  1, apply  to any (a, d) (and the associated  levels  of U and e) and not  just to profit-maximizing  a and 
j3  associated  with  a given  level  of expected  utility.  The same  remark  applies  to Proposition  4. 
' Furthermore,  with  nonseparable  utility,  effort  need  not be a continuous  function  of the contract  parameters. 
We have  chosen  not to treat  this  complication. 
" We have  considered  other  two-dimensional  perturbations:  (i) randomizing  the premium,  while holding 
the payout  fixed;  and (ii) randomizing  the payout,  while  varying  the premium  to maintain  profits  constant,  and 
investigating  the change  in expected  utility. 350  /  THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
A sufficient condition for a local randomization of the payout to be desirable is that at 
the deterministic optimum (denoted by *) a small, expected-utility-preserving  spread in a, 
while holding a  fixed, increase effort by enough that profits are increased. To calculate this 
we provide a payout of a  +  A half the time  and a  -  A half the time  and adjust a  to 
keep expected utility constant, and ascertain whether doing so increases profits. Define 
a(A; d*, u*) to be the value of a generated by this procedure, e(a', A; j3*) to be the associ- 
ated level of effort, and II(a&,  A;  *)(1  -  p(e))*  -  p(e')a.  Furthermore, evaluate all 
derivatives at the deterministic optimum. Now,  dll/dA  =  (Ol/OlA) + Ol/Oaa(da&/dA). 
Since the randomization is small,  dfI/dA  =  da&/dA =  0.  Hence,  it is necessary to ex- 
amine second derivatives. Specifically, the local randomization is desirable if and only if 
d211/dA2>  0. Tedious manipulation gives 
d2  t  p'(a  +  A  d3U  aR2U, d2U  ~2\  a  2U118y2 
dA2  Ee  Pey2  aey 
U,  a 
U/yyl +JJ  (9)/ 
where 
EUee = -Pl(UO  -  u)-2p)  +  d  (I-P)  +  0  p<0 
from the second-order conditions of the individual's effort choice problem. 
Proposition  4.12 A sufficient  condition for a local randomization of the payout to be desirable, 
with the premium held fixed, is that d2171/dA2  > 0, with the expression for d2fI/dA2  being 
given in (9). 
With separable  utility this condition cannot be satisfied, but theory imposes no natural 
restrictions on the values of  -or  ; hence, it appears that randomization can be 
Oe'y  Oey2'  de69y  cleC 
desirable.  3 
The result is depicted in Figure 1. In the neighborhood of the deterministic optimum, 
-<  0  (otherwise, both profits and expected utility could be increased with a rise in a). 
cOa 
Since also both the indifference  curve and isoprofit curve through the deterministic optimum 
have zero slope in A -  a space at the deterministic optimum, randomization is desirable 
if the isoprofit curve has greater positive curvature than the indifference curve. 
a  Ex ante randomization.  The desirability of ex ante randomization depends on quite a 
different set of considerations. 
Define EU(Hl) to be the maximum expected utility as a function of the insurer's (ex- 
pected) profit per client, H, when only deterministic contracts are admitted. The desirability 
of ex ante randomization depends on the curvature properties of EU( H).  This is shown in 
Figure 2. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the solution to the monopoly  insurer's 
problem with deterministic contracts occurs at C, with profit per contract of Hc. Now allow 
ex ante randomization. Since the realization of the random variable occurs before the in- 
dividual makes his effort decision, for any level of profit there is a unique expected-utility- 
maximizing policy. This implies that if the profit-maximizing contract contains more than 
one policy, each must have a different level of profits associated with it. Suppose that the 
insurer offers two ex ante random policies in his contract, policy A with profits HA  < HC 
and policy B with profits 1B  >  1c,  with the probability weights chosen so that the expected 
12 This proposition  has been proved previously  by Gjesdal  (1982, Proposition 3) for the continuum of outcomes 
case. Our proof, however, is new. 
13 Gjesdal (1982, pp. 382-383)  provides an example in which ex post randomization is desirable. ARNOTT AND  STIGLITZ  /  351 
FIGURE  1 
EX  POST  RANDOMIZATION  WITH  MORAL  HAZARD  (A  PREFERRED  TO  B) 
a 
H*  ~~U* 
(o,a*)B_; 
ISOPROFIT 
CU RVES 
1>e 
profit from the pair of contracts is lIc.  It is evident from the diagram that, as drawn, this 
ex ante randomization increases expected utility and is therefore desirable. It is also evident 
that the desirability of ex ante randomization stems from the convexity of EU(II)  near C, 
and that no more than two random policies are needed in a profit-maximizing contract 
with ex  ante  randomization. 
We formalize this intuition in a series of propositions. 
FIGURE  2 
EX  ANTE  RANDOMIZATION  WITH  MORAL  HAZARD  (WEIGHTED AVERAGE  OF  A  AND  B 
YIELDING  fl  PREFERRED  TO  C) 
EU  A 
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Proposition 5. If EU(  II) is concave, ex ante randomization is never desirable. 
Proposition 6. If EU(I)  is convex  at the level of profits at the deterministic monopoly 
insurer's profit maximum, then ex ante randomization is desirable.'4 
Proposition 7. With ex ante randomization no more than two random policies are required 
in the profit-maximizing insurance contract. 
In the absence of any moral-hazard problem, expected utility is a concave function of 
II because of diminishing marginal utility. But with moral hazard, as II changes, effort 
changes. In the normal case, as profit increases (decreases), the individual will expend more 
(less) effort at accident avoidance. If the absolute value of the individual's effort response 
is greater tor increases in profits than for decreases (in  a sense to be made more precise 
below),  expected utility may be a convex function of II and ex ante randomization may 
be desirable. 
It should be clear from Figure 2 that convexity  of EU(H)  at C is not a necessary 
condition for ex ante randomization to be desirable;  in particular, nonlocal randomization 
may be desirable even when EU(I)  is concave at C. The desirability of nonlocal random- 
ization is difficult to characterize because it depends on global rather than local properties 
of the event-contingent utility functions and the probability of accident function. In what 
follows we shall therefore consider only local randomizations. 
To simplify we hold f3  fixed at its level in the absence of randomization (since if expected 
utility can be increased via ex ante randomization with (  fixed, it can a fortiori be increased 
with fl variable) and treat the special case of a separable, event-independent utility function 
(lb).  Recall that from the individual's  maximization  problem without  randomization, 
we can express effort as a function  of the contract parameters; i.e.,  e  =  e(a,  (3). Now 
H =  3(1  -  p)  -  ap. Thus, we may write 
e(aof)=e(  p)e  )=e(Hlf).  (10) 
Substitute this into the expression for expected utility, 
A(11,~~~~~~~~~~~1)  (1  v~~~r~~p~~e^(n,:))-v~  ~  ~  ~~~(  A) 
-1P(e)uwd  +(  peu  (w-d  + (  A))  -e.  (1 1) 
Ex ante randomization is desirable  if 02 
V/0H2  >  0, evaluated at the deterministic optimum. 
The following expression for 02cV/01H2  is derived in Appendix A: 
aI2  =  j3  {Ze(VrIrIZ-  2VenjZeZII  +  VeeZri) 
- Ve(ZnZ~  -  2ZernZeZrn +  ZeeZi)}  (12) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and 
Z(Hl,,  e)  -p  ()u(w  -  A-uw  -  d +  p(eA)  )]  1 
We have thus established the following. 
Proposition 8. A sufficient condition for ex ante randomization to be desirable is that the 
expression  on the right-hand  side of( 12), evaluated  at the deterministic  optimum, be positive. 
This proposition is similar to Theorem 3 of Fellingham, Kwon, and Newman (1984). ARNOTT AND  STIGLITZ  /  353 
After substituting  the expressions  for the various partial  derivatives  in (12), the resulting 
expression is extremely messy. Nevertheless, the following argument establishes that  0112 
can be positive: The only place where p"'  enters the expression is through Zee.  The full term 
containing p'  is -  V Z2 (-p",(uO -  ul))/Z3.  Since Ve  > 0, Ze  < 0, and uO  -  ul > 0, then 
if p"' is negative and sufficiently large in absolute value, 02V/OIH2 will be positive."5  The 
reason for the complexity of the result is that what is relevant  is the extent to which successive 
increases in II lead to increases in effort (and how these increases in effort lead to increases 
in the likelihood of a loss). Since the level of effort depends on first  derivatives (say of p(e)), 
changes in levels depend on second derivatives, and differences in changes in levels (which 
are critical for ascertaining the convexity or concavity of profit as a function of H) depend 
on third derivatives. 
To simplify we have considered ex post and ex ante randomization in isolation.  It 
should be evident that there are circumstances in which it is desirable to use both forms of 
randomization simultaneously. 
3.  Adverse  selection 
*  It seems plausible that randomization can be desirable  when adverse selection is present, 
by altering  the position of the self-selection locus. To investigate this we treat the case where 
there are two groups in the population, one high-risk (H)  and one low-risk (L). 
The exposition of the adverse-selection case is simplified if we analyze the desirability 
of randomization in the context of a competitive insurance market, though as in the moral- 
hazard section, the results carry over to other market forms. In particular,  we start with the 
competitive equilibrium with deterministic contracts and investigate under what circum- 
stances a single insurer can increase his profits by randomizing his insurance contract. 
Suppose that the competitive equilibrium with deterministic contracts entails group H's 
receiving contract ( 'a',  AH)  and group L's receiving contract (a  ,  jH),  as depicted in Figure 
3. Group H's utility is U", and group L's utility is OL. The basic adverse-selection  mechanism 
in this context should be familiar. If insurers were able to distinguish between individuals 
in the two groups, the equilibrium contracts would be (aH,  4)  and (aL,  L),  providing 
each group with full and actuarially fair insurance. But with adverse selection, insurers are 
unable to distinguish between high- and low-risk individuals. As a consequence, if the con- 
tracts (a&,  AH)  and (aL,  AL)  were offered, the high-risk group would purchase (aL,  L), 
which would cause insurers in the aggregate to operate at a loss. If the proportion of the 
population in the high-risk group is above a certain critical level, which we assume is the 
case, competitive equilibrium entails (a&,  4H)  and (aL,  4L),  where (&L,  aL)  provides the 
maximum actuarially fair insurance to the low-risk group that is consistent with the high- 
risk group's preferring  to self-select, i.e., to choose (ary,  4H)  which is more expensive but 
provides more insurance, rather than the contract designed for low-risk individuals. Thus, 
aL,  fL)  lies on  3(I  -  pL)  aLpL  =  0, "just below" the point where U" intersects this 
zero-profit line. Since the high-risk group prefers  (a&,  4H)  to those contracts above 1H  in 
the figure, but not those below,  UH is called the self-selection locus. We focus on a single 
insurer  in this market, and examine conditions under which this firm can increase its profits 
by randomizing its contracts, with all other firms' continuing to offer the equilibrium de- 
terministic contracts. 
We now consider the use of randomization as a self-selection device. Again, random- 
ization can take on two forms. (Both are set out in Table 1.) In the first  the insurer  announces 
two contracts, denoted by A and B. If the individual chooses contract A, he will be assigned 
'5  Fellingham, Kwon, and Newman (1984, pp. 296-297)  provide an example in which ex ante randomization 
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FIGURE  3 
ADVERSE  SELECTION 
H3H(1  _pH)  _aH  pH = Q 
AH 
#8L(1  pL) _aLpL  0 
a 
policy  (a4',  #3 ) with  probability  Q4;  similarly,  if he chooses  contract  B, he will be assigned 
(r,  p3O)  with probability  Q  . The  individual  reveals  his type by his choice  of contract.  We 
say that offering such a pair of contracts  entails  ex post randomization,  since the uncertainty 
is resolved  after the individual  chooses  between  the two  contracts,  i.e.,  after he has revealed 
his  type.  Traditional  adverse-selection  models  can  be  viewed  as treating  the  case  where  A 
and  B both  consist  of a single  policy;  we ask here,  when  is this  desirable? 
In  the  second  form  that  randomization  may  take  the  insurer  gives  the  individual  a 
I 
lottery of policy pairs, Li  =  [(a4,  0A)  (NB,  Qi],  Z  Qi  =  1. The firm then randomly 
assigns  him  a policy  pair, e.g.,  Li, with  probability  Qi'.  Having  been  assigned  a policy  pair, 
say  Li,,  the  individual  can  then  choose  between  Ai,  =  (al",  it,) and  Bi,  =  (ail,  it,). The 
TABLE 1  The Timing of ex ante and ex post Randomization  with Adverse Selection 
Ex post Randomization  Ex ante Randomization 
Insurance firm offers two contracts:  Insurance firm offers a lottery of policy pairs: 
A  B  Li =  aI),  (ei,  d.), Qi] 
(atA  MA),  QA  JB,  #B),  QB 
(  2,  i),  Q  (42,  i),  QB  Q=  I. 
(:A4 H~)I Q  (am  F  QBi  Individual  randomly  assigned  Li with 
N  M  probability Qi. 
z  Qi  =~  Z QB  a=l  Having been assigned Li, individual chooses 
between 
Individual chooses A or B.  Ai =  (a4,  A3i)  and 
Individual randomly assigned insurance policy (4,  Ohi) 
with probability Q4 if chose A, etc.  B, =  (atB, i)- 
Uncertainty resolved after individual's choice (of  Uncertainty resolved before individual's 
lotteries),  choice of policies. ARNOTT AND STIGLITZ  /  355 
individual  reveals  his  type  through  his  choice  of  Ai,  or  Bi,.  We  say  that  such  a contract 
entails  ex ante randomization,  since  the uncertainty  is resolved  before  the individual  makes 
his choice,  and therefore  before  he reveals  his type.  In the standard  adverse-selection  model 
the individual  is offered  a single  pair of policies,  rather than  a lottery  of pairs of policies. 
We  shall  use  the  following  additional  notation:  n  K,  the  population  of  group  k, 
k  =  H,  L;  pk,  the  accident  probability  of  group  k;  uk,  the  utility  function  for group  k in 
the  event  of  no  accident;  and  Uk,  the  corresponding  utility  function  when  an  accident 
occurs.  Superscript  k (=H,  L)  on  a contract  parameter  indicates  that  the  corresponding 
contract  is designed  for group  k. 
We  first prove  the  following. 
Proposition  9.  The  insurer  can  always  do  at least  as  well  with  ex post  randomization,  as 
with  ex  ante randomization. 
Proof.  The  profit-maximizing  ex  ante  random  contract  solves 
max  nH((l  _ pH)  AQi0i  - pH  z  QiOaH) 
+  nL((l  -  pL)  z  Qj3L_  pL 
-  Qiai)  (13) 
i  i 
subject  to 
(1  -pH)  ug(w-  hi)Q,  + pH  H 
u(w  d+aH)Q>  OH 
(expected  utility  constraints)  (13a) 
pL) 
U 
L(W-fl)Q1  + pL  ufL(W-  d + aL)Q> 2L  (13b) 
0  1 
(1 -  pH)(uH(w  -  hi r) -  uo (w  -  hi "))  + pH(UHl  (-  d + ar') 
-  uH(  W -  d +  asi))  2  0  Vi  (self-selection  constraints)  (1 3c) 
I  Qi  1,  Qi >0  Vi.  (I 3d) 
i 
Consider  the  profit-maximization  problem  identical  to  (13)  in all respects  except  that 
the  set of constraints  (1 3c)  is replaced  by 
(1 -p)  W(uH(w-,)  uH(wfl  ))Q  + p (uH  (wd+H) 
-al t(w-d  + Iaf))Qi  0. 
We term this the modified-maximization  problem.  Since  this  constraint  is weaker  than  the 
set of constraints  (1 3c),  profits  are at least  as high  for the  modified-maximization  problem 
as for (1 3).  But  the  modified  maximization  problem  is that  of an insurer  who  undertakes 
ex post  randomization.  Q.E.D. 
We  have  established  that  ex  ante  randomization  is  unnecessary  by  showing  that  ex 
post  randomization  is always  at least  as profitable.  If there  are restrictions  on  ex post  ran- 
domization,  ex  ante  randomization  may  still be desirable.  We  shall  not,  however,  attempt 
to determine  conditions  under  which  ex  ante  randomization  is, in fact,  desirable. 
Proposition  9  is  useful  because  it enables  us  to  focus  on  ex  post  randomization.  Ex 
post  randomization  of  the  high-risk  group's  contract  is  unambiguously  harmful  since  it 
reduces  the profitability  of the high-risk  group's  contract,  while  leaving  the low-risk  group's 
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has two possibly off-setting effects. On the one hand, the low-risk individuals must be com- 
pensated for the increased risk they then face. On the other hand, such randomization may 
weaken the self-selection constraint. If high-risk individuals are very risk averse, they will 
shy away from the randomized contract and allow the low-risk individuals to obtain more 
insurance on average than they otherwise would. The propositions that follow capture this 
intuition. 
We start by considering the case where high- and low-risk individuals have the same 
tastes (event-contingent utility functions).  Let b be the certainty-equivalent insurance pre- 
mium corresponding to the ex post random contract { ai, f3i, Qi }, defined implicitly by 
uo(w -  b)  z  uo(w -  f3i)Qi,  (14a) 
and let a be the certainty-equivalent insurance payout, defined implicitly by 
ul(w  -d  +  a)--  ul(w  - d+  ai)Qi.  (I 4b) 
The expected utility for an individual in group k is, using (14), 
EUk  =(1  -pk)(  W  -  f1)Q1) + pk(I  ul(w  -d  + a1)Qi) 
i  i 
=  (1 -  pk)uo(w-  b)  +  pku,(w-  d+  a).  (15) 
Thus, expected utility can be expressed in terms of the certainty-equivalent premium and 
payout corresponding to any ex post random contract. Meanwhile, we can write the self- 
selection constraint as 
( p1  -pH)(uo(  -  bH)  -  uo(w  -  bL)) 
+ pH(ul(w  -  d +  a')  -  ul(w  -  d +  aL))  0,  (16) 
where  (ak,  bk)  is the  certainty-equivalent  of  the  random  contract  {4as,  fl,  Qk}  designed 
for group k. Next, define fik  e  Z  QkBk  to be the average premium in the random contract 
designed for group k,  and -ak  Q&ak  to be the corresponding average payout. Risk 
aversion implies that ak  a  ak  and bk 2  k, with at least one of the inequalities being strict 
if the corresponding contract is randomized. 
The group k expected utility constraint, using (  15),  may be written as 
(1  pk)Uo(w-  bk) +  pku,(w-  d + ak)  >  L  k  k = H  L.  (17) 
We have shown that with a random contract the self-selection constraint and the ex- 
pected utility constraints can be expressed in terms of the certainty-equivalent premium 
and payout of that contract. The insurer's profit-maximization problem, with ex post ran- 
domization, may be written as 
max  n  a  pk)fkpkak)  (18) 
{a ak  bk Ok  }  k=H  L 
k=H,L 
subject to (a) (16) (the self-selection constraint), (b) (17) (the expected utility constraints), 
and (c)  ak  a  Pk, bk  2  pk  From this formulation, it is evident  that  the  profit-maximizing 
contract pair has the properties a  =  ak  and w3k  =  bk for k = H,  L, and therefore that ex 
post  randomization is undesirable. 
This result is stated in the following.'6 
It can  also  be proved,  rather  obviously,  that  with  adverse  selection  and  two groups,  randomization  is never 
desirable  if the high-risk  group  is less  risk  averse  than  the low-risk  group. ARNOTT AND STIGLITZ  /  357 
Proposition 10. With adverse selection and two groups that differ in risk but not in tastes, 
ex post randomization is never desirable. 
The intuition underlying this result can be seen from Figure 4. The premiums and 
payouts  of  the  deterministic equilibrium contracts equal their corresponding certainty 
equivalents, i.e., (a^,  4H)  =  (aH,  bH) and (aL  4L)  =  (aL,  bL). Thus, the equilibrium with 
deterministic contracts can be represented in a -  b space; see Figure 4. 
Now consider randomizing the contract for the low-risk group while holding UC and 
CIL  fixed. Since the randomization does not alter the position of the self-selection constraint 
in a-b space, the low-risk group's certainty-equivalent policy remains (aL,  bL)  Since with 
randomization aL >  a'  and $L ?  bL, with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly, 
then  L(1  -  pL)  a  ALpL  <  b'(1  -  pL)  -  aLpL  =  0. Thus,  the randomization  reduces  profits 
on the low-risk  group's policy, while leaving profits  on the high-risk  group's  policy unaffected. 
We now examine the situation where individuals differ in terms of both risk class and 
tastes for risk. We derive a condition  under which a small amount  of randomization is 
desirable. 
We randomize the contract for low-risk individuals in such a way that:  17 (i) there are 
two policies, both with probability .5; (ii) low-risk individuals' utility is the same with either 
policy and equals their certainty utility; and (iii) the profit level on the low-risk contract is 
maintained. Randomization  will then be desirable if (and only if) it lowers the utility of 
the high-risk individuals when they hold the low-risk contract, since if this happens, the 
self-selection constraint is relaxed, and the low-risk contract can then be adjusted to increase 
its profitability. To simplify the algebra, we assume that both groups' utility functions are 
event-independent. 
This randomization satisfies the conditions: 
(1 -  pL)uL(w  -  IL) +  pLUL(W-  d +  aL)  =  cL  (19a) 
FIGURE  4 
RANDOMIZATION  UNDESIRABLE  WHEN  BOTH  GROUPS  HAVE  SAME  TASTES 
bA 
bH (1-pH)  -  aHpH  =  o 
O'H (THE  SELF-SELECTION  LOCUS) 
(a  A6  /  UL 
bL(j  _pL)  -  aLpL  =  o 
L~~~~~~ 
/AL  L  opa 
17We would like to thank Stephen Slutsky and John Hamilton for suggesting this randomization procedure 
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(  p  )U(W-  L) +  pLUL(Wd+aL)  UL  (19b) 
(1  pL)(f#L  +  j3L)  -  pL(af  +  aL)  =  0.  (20) 
The expected utility of a high-risk individual when he purchases a low-risk contract is 
EUH =  5{(  pH)(UH(w-  L) +  UH(wf-  #L)) 
+ pH(uH(w-  d +  af  )  +  uH(W  -  d + aL))}*  (21) 
We show in Appendix B that the first-order  effect of an infinitesimal randomization of this 
nature is zero; i.e., dEUH/daL  =  0, evaluated at the deterministic equilibrium. To ascertain 
the desirability of a small randomization, we investigate the sign of d2EUH/d(a  L)2 at the 
deterministic equilibrium. Define: 
6  pL  \  (UW)'  the slope of the low-risk indifference curve  (22a) 
k  1  LpL  (uL)'  with  the  contract  (a  L,  d L); 
r  Uk( 
,  the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption 
rk  =  (  k ),,  in the no-accident to accident events for group  (22b) 
k with the contract (aI,  I  I); 
Ak = j_  (4)"  the (local)  coefficient of absolute risk aversion for group k  (22c) 
(tU4)t  and event j with the contract (af,  iEL); and 
(1-pL  (22d) 
Note that: (i)  t1 <  1; (ii) with risk aversion and incomplete insurance, rk <  1 for k = H, L; 
and (iii)  the greater the degree of risk aversion, the smaller is rk (when holding (a  L, A L) 
constant). Then we can show (we explain the procedure of the derivation in Appendix B) 
that for A  >  0 (finitely greater than zero) for j = 0,  1; k = H, L: 
r  d2EUH 1 
sgn  -d(a)2J  =  sgn [-A  j(  nrHO(1 -  r  L))  -  AIr  L(l  -  r  L) 
+ ALrLO(I  -  r  H)  + A 
L 
rL(1  -r  H)].  (23) 
Let Ak denote the minimum of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for uk(y)  with 
y E [w  -  d, w], and jk  the corresponding maximum,  k = H, L. Propositions 11 and 12 
then follow from the derivation of (23). 
Proposition 11. For any ( w, d,  uL(.  ),  pH,  pL)  such that d >  0, pH  >  pL,  and AL finite, there 
is a finite number AH such that with AH >  4H, ex post randomization is desirable. 
The intuition for this result is straightforward.  When a high-risk individual is infinitely 
risk-averse, he will care only about the worst possible outcome.  Since the randomization 
worsens the worst possible outcome  when the low-risk contract is bought, it reduces the 
utility of the high-risk individual when he purchases the low-risk contract, which relaxes 
the self-selection constraint. 
Proposition 12. For any (w,  d,  u"(*),  pH,  pL)  such that d >  0, and pH  >  pL,  there is a 
finite number A L such that with A L < A L, ex post randomization is desirable. 
Consider  the extreme case whereA L  is close to zero. Then the randomization undertaken 
is almost a randomization along the low-risk zero-profit line. Because the high-risk group 
is risk-averse,  its expected utility increases less from the increase in insurance in one policy 
than its expected utility decreases from the almost same-sized decrease in insurance in the 
other  policy.  Hence, the randomization  loosens  the self-selection  constraint. ARNOTT AND STIGLITZ  /  359 
Note  that  none  of  the  above  results  depends  on  constancy  of  absolute  risk  aversion 
and that finite  randomizations  may  be Pareto-improving  even  when  infinitesimal  random- 
izations  are not. 
We  have  examined  the  circumstances  under  which  randomization  is  desirable  with 
either  moral  hazard  or adverse  selection,  and  have  explained  the  results.  Future  research 
should  extend  these  results  to  the  general  situation  where  both  moral  hazard  and  adverse 
selection  are present. 
4.  Discussion 
*  In the  previous  two  sections  we  used  standard  assumptions  to  derive  necessary  or suf- 
ficient  conditions  for the  randomization  of insurance  contracts  to  be desirable.  We  inves- 
tigated the desirability  of randomization  by analyzing  whether  randomization  could  increase 
the  profits  of  an  insurer  faced  with  expected  utility  constraints.  It bears  repeating  that  if 
each insurer can observe  his clients'  total purchases  of insurance,  competitive  equilibrium  8 
coincides  with  the  solution  to  the  monopoly  insurer's  problem  when  the  expected  utility 
levels  are those  that  would  obtain  in competitive  equilibrium.  Hence,  all our  results  apply 
to both  the  competitive-equilibrium  and  monopoly-insurer  cases. 
In the  absence  of  relevant  empirical  work,  it is  not  possible  to  say  how  stringent  the 
conditions  we derived  for randomization  to be desirable  in fact are. None  of our arguments 
implies  that randomization  is "normally"  undesirable,  however.  Thus,  it is remarkable  that 
randomization  of  insurance  contracts  is  not  in  fact  observed.  This  statement  needs  to  be 
qualified  somewhat  since  the  seeming  capriciousness  of  the  tax  collector  and  insurance 
adjustor  could  be  veiled  forms  of  randomization.'9  Nevertheless,  we  know  of  no  explicit 
random  contracts  in  competitive  insurance  markets.  How  can  we  explain  this  apparent 
discrepancy  between  theory  and  fact? 
Along  with  the  possibility  that  the  conditions  for  randomization  are  never  met,  we 
have  come  up  with  six  reasons  why  randomization  might  not  occur  so  frequently  as the 
theory  suggests.  Each  of these  reasons  leads  one  to question  the appropriateness  of some  of 
the assumptions  underlying  our analysis and more generally underlying  much  of the literature 
on  incentives  and  contracts,  particularly  that  focusing  on  nonlinear  contracts. 
(1)  Firms  may  not  have  discovered  the  advantages  of randomization  or customers  may  be 
reluctant  to  purchase  random  insurance  policies  since  they  do  not  understand  them.  To 
the extent  that this explanation  is valid,  one  must  question  the appropriateness  of assuming 
that the  contracting  parties  exhibit  unbounded  rationality. 
(2)  A  related  argument  is that  it is  costly  to  write  down  and  enforce  complex  contracts. 
This  argument  is  consistent  with  the  observation  that  nonstochastic  contracts  are almost 
invariably  considerably  less complex  than  contract  theory  predicts.  If this argument  carries 
force,  then  contract  theory  should  treat the  costs  of complexity. 
Simple  contracts  may  be  observed  not  only  because  the  costs  of complexity  are high, 
but also  because  the  benefits  are low.20 
18 By competitive equilibrium, we mean a Nash equilibrium in contracts with free entry and exit. In the case 
of adverse selection this statement applies only when competitive equilibrium exists. See Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) for a discussion of nonexistence of competitive equilibrium in this context. 
1  We consider this unlikely, however. A more plausible explanation for the randomness of tax audits is that 
decreasing  the probability of audit, while holding the expected fine constant, reduces administrative costs. 
20 In moral-hazard  theory it is assumed that insurance  companies know the accident  technology and consumers 
tastes perfectly, and in adverse-selection theory that they know consumers' tastes and the composition  of the 
population perfectly. Intuition suggests that the more imperfect is insurers' knowledge, the smoother the optimal 
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(3)  Even  in those  circumstances  where  randomization  of insurance  contracts  is desirable, 
insured  individuals  would  obtain  insurance  against  the  randomization  if they  could.  They 
would  perceive  the  benefits  of randomization  insurance,  but  because  they  act  noncooper- 
atively would  neglect that, in response  to everyone's  purchasing  the randomization  insurance, 
accident  insurance  companies  would  be  forced  to  offer  less  attractive  contracts  to  break 
even.  Indeed,  full randomization  insurance  would  completely  neutralize  the  effects  of ran- 
domization  of the accident  insurance  contract,  and so accident  insurance  firms would  have 
no  incentive  to  randomize.  The  analysis  assumed  away  such  randomization  insurance.2' 
But  with  limited  observability,  which  underlies  both  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection, 
the  assumption  may  be  unwarranted.22  A  more  satisfactory  analysis  would  describe  the 
economy  in such a way that the markets that are present and the contracts  that are enforceable 
are derived  rather than  assumed. 
(4)  In some  contexts  (e.g.,  the draft in the United  States)  lotteries  are commonly  regarded 
as fair, in  other  contexts  as unfair  (horizontal  equity).  While  the  persuasive  modelling  of 
fairness  and  horizontal  equity  has  proved  elusive,  it  may  be  that  consumers  would  find 
random  insurance  policies  unattractive  because  they  view  them  as unfair. 
(5)  For other familiar  reasons one may question  the appropriateness  of using von Neumann- 
Morgenstern  expected  utility  theory  (Machina,  1987). 
(6)  Such  contracts  may  not  be employed  because  individuals  may  not  trust their  insurers 
to randomize  in the manner  specified  in their contracts.  To know whether a firm is complying 
with  the  contract,  an  individual  must  know  not  only  which  policy  he  has  been  assigned, 
but  also  which  policies  have  been  assigned  to  all the  other  clients.  Even  if he were  able  to 
verify  that  the  firm  assigned  the  policies  with  the  contractually  specified  probabilities,  the 
firm could  still cheat  by assigning  the policies  in a systematic  way, e.g., to friends  or to those 
offering  kickbacks.  Whether  reputation  would  be  an  effective  enforcement  mechanism  in 
this  context  is moot. 
A final point  is that precluding  randomization  by assumption  is not  a satisfactory  way 
of treating  the  empirical  fact that  random  contracts  are not  observed.  First, by prohibiting 
randomization  from  entering  through  the front door,  one  might  find it entering  in disguised 
form  through  the  back  door.  For  example,  suppose  that  our  moral-hazard  model  were 
enriched  to  allow  for several  symmetric  types  of accidents.  If random  insurance  contracts 
were excluded  by assumption,  then  in some  circumstances  in which  ex ante randomization 
In this context  it should  be noted  that  the literature  on the randomization  of insurance  contracts,  including 
this  article,  has  not  attempted  to measure  the  benefits  from  randomization,  though  doing  so would  not  be excessively 
difficult. 
21 The  problem  of side-contracts  is a pervasive,  though  neglected,  one  in contract  theory.  For  instance,  whenever 
payment  schedules  are  nonlinear,  there  is an incentive  for side-payments  and the creation  of secondary  markets. 
If the payment  function  is concave,  individuals  have  an incentive  to smooth  measured  output  (selling  output  on 
the  secondary  market  when  output  is high,  and  buying  when  it is low) and  to make  measured  output  more  uneven 
when  the  payment  schedule  is convex  (e.g.,  by introducing  randomization).  The  presence  of such  secondary  markets 
provides  one explanation  for  the linearity  of payment  schedules. 
22 By  treating  a monopoly  insurer,  the  analysis  assumed  that  individuals'  total  purchases  of accident  insurance 
are observable.  In these  circumstances,  competitive  equilibrium  is characterized  by exclusivity-each insurance 
company  will  require  that  its clients  purchase  insurance  only  from  itself.  In this  case  it is not inconsistent  to assume 
away  randomization  insurance,  since  accident  insurance  companies  may  be able  to observe  their  clients'  purchases 
of randomization  insurance  as well. Exclusive  accident  contracts  are also enforceable  if the accident  insurance 
companies  cannot  observe  individuals'  total  purchases  of accident  insurance,  but can enforce  refusing  to make  a 
payment  in the event  of accident  if the insured  receives  payment  from  any other  company  for the accident.  This 
requires  that  accident  insurance  companies  monitor  only victims.  With  this more  limited  form  of observability,  it 
is not inconsistent  to assume  that  accident  insurance  firms  can enforce  exclusive  accident  insurance  contracts,  but 
cannot  monitor  their  clients'  purchases  of randomization  insurance. ARNOTT AND STIGLITZ  /  361 
is  desirable,  competitive  equilibrium  would  entail  extended  exclusivity  (each  individual 
would  purchase  all his insurance  from  a single  firm)  and  firms'  randomly  cross subsidizing 
between  types  of insurance,  e.g.,  one  firm might  run a loss  on cancer  insurance  financed  by 
its profits  from  automobile  accident  insurance.  Doing  so would  allow  firms to  randomize 
indirectly.  Second,  one cannot  be sure that whatever  considerations  (discussed  above)  result 
in  random  insurance  contracts'  not  being  observed  do  not  also  have  implications  for the 
structure  of nonrandom  contracts.  For example,  if complexity  is important,  the competitive 
equilibrium  contract  may  be  simple,  linear,  and  nonrandom.  But  if  one  were  simply  to 
exclude  random  contracts  by assumption,  without  explicitly  treating complexity,  the solution 
might  indicate  that  the  equilibrium  contract  would  be  highly  nonlinear  and  complex.  For 
both these reasons,  disallowing  random  contracts  by assumption  is likely to generate  spurious 
results. 
Appendix  A 
*  Derivation  of  a20V/012.  Define 
V(nfl7,  e'(L  A)) = (I -  p(e))u(w  -  8) + p(e)u  w -  d +  (  ) -e  (Al) 
and 
Z(IL 0, e(IL a)) =-  p (e') u(w  w-  ) 
- u  w -d  +  I-PM)  ) 
II 
(A2) 
Then 
OYc  dV  G 
l  d-l 
=  VI +  Ve  (A3) 
where subscripts  denote partial derivatives. From the individual's effort choice problem 
Ce'  Zr  A 
ORI  Ze  (A4) 
Combining (A3)  and (A4) gives 
n  =  -  (V11Ze  VeZ1i)  (A5)  G1IZe 
Then 
(I  dV \  dV\ 
a2V  d2V  dfl,  +  dl  -  (A  6 
,3j7j2=  1=  an  +  ae  an  (=) 
=  {Ze(VijijZ  2-  2VenZeZn  +  VeZ)-V(ZIIZ  -  2ZenZeZn  +  ZeeZ2)}]  (A7) 
Appendix  B 
*  Derivation of d2EUH/d(af  )2 at the deterministic equilibrium. Let 
k = d  (Uk(W  d+  L))  k  d  (Uk(W  L)) 
dy 
-d 
2dy2 
Xk  =  d (Uk(W  -  d + af L))  yk  =  d  (uk(w-  #f))  (A8) 
dy  dy 
Total differentiation of (19)  and (20)  gives 
dc4  ki ~pLL  \xLj  daL  k  XL-  y1  L  ly  L 
Iox  1  _  pL  YLJ  da  L  \%L  _  cy  L  TL 
dp  L  XL\  d#  L  d#  L2  itda  L 
do2L  \  L  -Jy  LJ  da  L  \da2LJ  da  LJ 362  /  THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Now, from (21), 
dEUH  KyH  IL  cH?\  HI  doa2\ 
daf  (lp)  daf  da)  +Pq  (A10) 
When the amount of randomization is infinitesmal, 
aL  =  a  ,  #L=  #Y,  y  ,  =  XH  X  ,  df/da,  = -df#L/daL, 
and daL/daf  =  -1.  Hence, at the deterministic equilibrium, 
dEUH  =  Al 
L=  ?-  (AI  1) 
daf 
To determine the effect of an infinitesimal randomization, we investigate d2EUH/d(  aL)2. Substituting (A9)  into 
(AI 0), totally differentiating  the resulting  expression,  and using the above relations  when the amount of randomization 
is infinitesimal give (23). 
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